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Abstract
We study a problem inspired by regulated health insurance markets, such as those created
by the government in the Affordable Care Act Exchanges or by employers when they contract
with private insurers to provide plans for their employees. The market regulator can choose
to do nothing, running a Free Market, or can exercise her regulatory power by limiting the
entry of providers (decreasing consumer welfare by limiting options, but also decreasing revenue
via enhanced competition). We investigate whether limiting entry increases or decreases the
utility (welfare minus revenue) of the consumers who purchase from the providers, specifically
in settings where the outside option of “purchasing nothing” is prohibitively undesirable.
We focus primarily on the case where providers are symmetric. We propose a sufficient
condition on the distribution of consumer values for (a) a unique symmetric equilibrium to
exist in both markets and (b) utility to be higher with limited entry. (We also establish that
these conclusions do not necessarily hold for all distributions, and therefore some condition
is necessary.) Our techniques are primarily based on tools from revenue maximization, and
in particular Myerson’s virtual value theory. We also consider extensions to settings where
providers have identical costs for providing plans, and to two providers with an asymmetric
distribution.
1. Introduction
In the Affordable Care Act (ACA) Exchanges, the government plays the role of the market regulator,
contracting with several private health insurance providers to offer insurance plans to a number of
patients, or consumers. Each insurance provider posts a price for his insurance plan, which he
can sell to an unlimited number of consumers, and then each consumer chooses a plan to purchase
among those for sale. Further, the ACA originally imposed an “individual mandate” that charges
a steep penalty to consumers who do not purchase any plan, whose aim was to essentially make it
mandatory for every consumer to purchase some plan.
In the ACA exchanges, prices set by providers tend to be high1, and little regulatory power
exercised is by the government (for example, the ACA establishes minimum coverage guarantees,
∗Princeton University (messaidi@cs.princeton.edu).
†Columbia University (kgoldner@cs.columbia.edu). Supported in part by NSF CCF-1420381 and by a Microsoft
Research PhD Fellowship. Supported in part by NSF award DMS-1903037 and a Columbia Data Science Institute
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1In 2013, even with subsidies, premiums represented between 4 and 9.5% of the median income [Johnson, Hassin,
Baker, Bajger, and Treuer, 2013]. In 2015, a survey found that without subsidies, average marketplace unsubsidized
premiums were over 2.5× what most consumers claim is the maximum they can afford [Williams, 2016].
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but otherwise is not an active regulator). One reason cited for these high prices is that the insurance
market has a high barrier to entry, so once incumbent providers have surpassed this barrier, they
face little competition. The motivating scenario to have in mind is that there may be multiple
incumbents but, due to entry barriers, each incumbent serves a section of the market significantly
better than all others. Could the government improve consumer utility by further regulating the
market? For instance, what if the government were to only allow the insurance providers offering
the five least expensive plans to enter the exchanges? This would create competition and ensure
lower prices. However, it would also mean fewer options, excluding the favorite choices of some
consumers’ from the market, and thus leading to lower consumer welfare. That is, such regulation
decreases both prices and welfare, so it not immediately obvious whether it improves consumer
utility (which is the difference of the two). The main purpose of this paper is to provide theoretical
tools to reason about this tradeoff, and understand under what circumstances consumer utility is
improved.
The ACA exchanges are an example of a regulated health insurance market. Another common
example concerns an employer who contracts with providers in order to provide health insurance
to her employees. In this paper, we focus on such regulated markets, where a market regulator
can determine which providers enter the market, and where every consumer must purchase a plan.2
Note that while healthcare is our motivating example, the model is not limited to only healthcare,
but applies to any situation where purchase is mandatory.
The focus of this paper is the following: under what conditions does limited entry (reducing
prices via competition, but also reducing welfare via reduced options) improve consumer utility?
Observe that reasoning about this question requires a direct understanding of what prices the
providers will choose to set. As such, our main techniques involve characterizing and analyzing
equilibria, and understanding when they exist and are unique. We compare two settings: the Free
Market setting, where the market regulator does not restrict entry at all, and the Limited Entry
setting. Note, of course, that while we use healthcare exchanges as a motivating example, the
focus of our paper is to provide a model and theoretical tools which are generally applicable. As
such, our model is stylized and intended to capture one key decision facing regulators of healthcare
exchanges (whether to limit entry or not)—it is not intended to capture verbatim the full range of
challenges facing healthcare regulators. Still, we do emphasize that this is indeed a key decision
facing regulators of healthcare exchanges, and that theoretical tools from mechanism design indeed
provide insight to make these decisions.
1.1. Model and Results
Our goal is to provide a clean model to reason about the impact of limiting entry. To this end, we
consider n providers, and consider a population D of consumers, each with a value vi for the plan
offered by provider i. For the majority of the paper, we consider the symmetric setting, where a
random consumer from D has value vi for plan i drawn i.i.d. from some single-variate distribution
F (that is, while individual consumers have different values for different providers, the providers
2Put another way, the outside option of purchasing nothing is so undesirable that all rational consumers will choose
to purchase something, even at negative utility. This may be due to an explicit fine (individual mandate), or simply
because the outside option of being uninsured is so undesirable. But we do not explicitly model this undesirable
outside option.
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are a priori identical).3 We denote this as D := Fn.
In Section 3, we study the Free Market setting, where each provider i simply sets a price pi,
and consumers drawn from D purchase the plan i which maximizes their utility vi − pi. We first
identify sufficient conditions on F (involving a new condition we term “MHR+”) for the existence
of a unique symmetric equilibrium, and we characterize the equilibrium prices in the Free Market.
Here, hn2 (F ) denotes the expected hazard rate of the second-highest of n i.i.d. draws from F , and
formal definitions of both technical terms appear in Section 2.
Theorem 1.1. Let D := Fn, where F is MHR+ and has decreasing density. Then the unique
symmetric equilibrium in the Free Market setting is for each provider to set price 1/hn2 (F ).
Observe that a characterization of a canonical equilibrium in the Free Market setting is necessary
if we are to possibly anlayze consumer utility. We include one vignette regarding our technical
approach, which leverages machinery from the revenue maximization literature Myerson [1981].
Suppose all other providers are setting price p; what is a provider’s best-response? To reason about
this, consider instead a new distribution F ∗p such that 1− F ∗p (q) is the probability that a consumer
drawn from marginal F will purchase from this provider if he sets price q, given that all other
providers set price p. The provider’s best response is to set q∗ which maximizes his expected profit,
q ·(1−F ∗p (q)), and p is therefore a symmetric equilibrium if and only if p = q∗. Using this rephrasing,
we then argue that if this distribution F ∗p happens to have a monotone hazard rate (MHR), then
we are guaranteed the existence of a unique equilibrium. Of course, this distribution F ∗p is quite
different from F itself (for example, F may be MHR and F ∗p may not even be regular!). We define a
new distributional assumption, MHR+, such that if F is MHR+then this implies that F ∗p is MHR.
We postpone a formal definition of MHR+to Section 3, but only note here that it is a strictly stronger
condition than MHR, and that most common MHR distributions are also MHR+(e.g. exponential,
uniform, Gaussian).
Next, in Section 4, we study the Limited Entry setting. Formally, each provider still sets a price
pi, but now only the n − 1 providers with lowest price enter the market (tie-breaking arbitrarily).
Consumers again pick the plan maximizing vi − pi, but only among these n − 1 providers. For
symmetric instances, quickly observe that there is a unique symmetric equilibrium, and in it all
providers set pi = 0 (so in some sense, our model can be seen as “optimistic” towards the benefits
of limiting entry). The main result of this section is a characterization of the precise condition on
F that implies that consumer utility in the Limited Entry setting will be greater than in the Free
Market setting; we call this the Limit-Entry condition.
Definition 1.1 (Limit-Entry Condition). We say that a symmetric distribution D = Fn satisfies the
Limit-Entry Condition if Hn1 (F ) ≤ n/hn2 (F ). Here, Hn1 (F ) is the expected inverse hazard rate of the
highest of n i.i.d. draws from F . (Recall that hn2 (F ) is the expected hazard rate of the second-highest
of n i.i.d. draws from F .)
Theorem 1.2. Let D := Fn and admit a symmetric equilibrium in the Free Market setting. Then
the expected consumer utility at the unique symmetric equilibrium in the Limited Entry setting
exceeds that at the unique symmetric equilibrium in the Free Market setting if and only if F satisfies
the Limit-Entry Condition.
3To have an example in mind, consider a provider which offers a good network for patients with diabetes, and
another which offers a good network for patients with a history of cancer. Any particular patient will of course have
different values for the plans, based on their own medical history. But the population as a whole does not necessarily
prefer one over the other.
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Finally, while the Limit-Entry condition is relatively clean, it is not obvious how it relates to more
common distributional assumptions. Our final main result shows that the Limit-Entry condition is
satisfied under standard distributional assumptions.
Theorem 1.3. Let D := Fn, where F is MHR and has decreasing density. Then F satisfies the
Limit-Entry Condition.
Corollary 1.4. Let D := Fn, where F is MHR+ and has decreasing density. Then D has a unique
symmetric equilibrium in the Free Market setting, and the expected consumer utility at this unique
equilibrium is exceeded by the expected consumer utility in the Limited Entry setting.
In the interest of completeness, we examine whether any of our assumptions can possibly be
relaxed to more standard assumptions (e.g. MHR+ to MHR). In short, Proposition 1.5 establishes
that the answer is no, suggesting that there is indeed a relevant aspect of our stronger assumptions
as it relates to our conclusions.
Proposition 1.5. (Different) distributions D := Fn with the following properties all exist:
• F is MHR, but there exists a p for which F ∗p is not MHR (in fact, it is anti-MHR).
• F is MHR, but D has no symmetric equilibrium in the Free Market setting.
• D has a symmetric equilibrium in the Free Market setting, but does not satisfy the Limit-Entry
Condition.
• D satisfies the Limit-Entry Condition, but does not have a symmetric equilibrium in the Free
Market setting.
Finally, we include some extensions. In Section 5, we extend our results to the setting where
providers have identical costs for providing service. In Section 6, we consider the case of asymmetric
distributions D = ×iFi. We prove that if Fi is MHR+, then the asymmetric analog, F ∗i,~p−i , is MHR.
We also show that for two providers, when F ∗i,~p−i is MHR, an equilibrium exists.
1.2. Related Work
In order to compare with the literature on procurement auctions, we will call the providers “sup-
pliers.” To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to study procurement of suppliers
under mandatory purchase of consumers. The following literature review pertains to procurement
auctions without mandatory purchase for consumers. The most relevant work is that of [Saban
and Weintraub, 2019]. They also study procurement auctions with n heterogenous goods, each
owned by a different supplier, a consumer population, and a mechanism designer whose objective
is to maximize consumer utility. The simplest comparison between these works is that [Saban and
Weintraub, 2019] study a wide variety of different procurement models, whereas we focus on depth
of one particular model. For example, our work fits into their “First-Price Auction” model (which is
only one of many models they consider). But within this model, they consider only a two-supplier
setting in a simple Hotelling game [Hotelling, 1929],4 whereas we study this model in significantly
more depth and generality.
4Specifically: consumers are uniformly distributed along the unit line. Each supplier offers an item with fixed
value at the endpoint of the line, and consumers value the items at their value minus the distance.
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Other work in procurement [Anton and Gertler, 2004; McGuire and Riordan, 1995] also studies
optimal centralized allocations for consumer utility, where the designer can choose which suppliers
allocate to which consumers. We do not study this form of allocation at all.
Most prior work studies the two-supplier case without mandatory purchase. [Engel, Fischer, and
Galetovic, 2002] also uses a third-party mechanism designer apart from consumers and suppliers,
but studies different objectives than us: (1) welfare (consumer utility plus supplier revenue) and (2)
supplier revenue minimization. They do not, however, study consumer utility maximization.
Other works allow the consumers to act as the auctioneer [Chen and Li, 2013; Dana Jr, 2012]
and investigate whether it is better for the consumers to have one or two suppliers; the answer
differs depending on whether the consumers’ information is private or not. These papers do not
have a mechanism designer acting separately from the consumers; they also only study the stylized
Hotelling model.
1.3. Brief Summary
We study consumer utility in a market with n providers under mandatory purchase, motivated by the
current state of ACA exchanges (Free Market) versus employer insurance markets (Limited Entry).
We find clean sufficient conditions for equilibria to exist (Theorem 1.1) in the Free Market setting,
and establish that conditions like these are also necessary (Proposition 1.5). We also establish clean
necessary and sufficient conditions for consumer utility to improve with Limited Entry over the Free
Market (Theorems 1.2 and 1.3, and Corollary 1.4).
We also wish to briefly note the technical highlights. Typically, establishing existence/uniqueness
of market equilibria requires solving a system of non-linear equations (and establishing uniqueness).
Of course, our proofs must also accomplish this, but we get a surprising amount of leverage via
Myersonian virtual value theory. That is, we interpret equilibrium conditions as one price being
revenue-maximizing for a related consumer distribution. Due to mandatory purchase, this interpre-
tation (while mathematically involved) is conceptually fairly clean. This enables us to break down
a complex mathematical proof into conceptually digestible chunks, and also provides insight into
the right conditions to search for. We are optimistic that these tools will continue to be useful in
extensions beyond those considered explictly in this paper.
2. Notation and Preliminaries
We consider the following problem from the perspective of a market regulator. We use the language
of healthcare providers throughout the paper (although we again remind the reader that healthcare
exchanges are just a motivating example for our stylized model). There are n providers, each of
whom produces a single (distinct) plan. Each individual consumer in the market has a valuation
vector ~v ∈ Rn+ for the plans, with vi denoting their value for plan i. The market consists of a
continuum over valuations ~v, which can alternatively be interpreted as a distribution D (over a
random consumer drawn from the market).
We assume throughout the paper that D is a product distribution (that is, D := ×iDi for
single-dimensional Di). We will use Fi to denote the CDF of Di, and assume that each Di also
has a density function, or PDF, denoted by fi. For our main results, we will also assume that D is
symmetric (that is, Di = Dj for all i, j, or the valuations are identically drawn across providers).
In Section 6, we consider extensions to asymmetric distributions.
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In our context, let’s briefly elaborate on these assumptions. Assuming that each Di admits a
density function is extremely common in past literature (e.g. Myerson [1981]), and is comparable
to a “large market” assumption that no particular individual has an oversized role. The motivation
for this assumption is purely technical, since it allows for clean closed-form definitions of conditions
such as regularity or Monotone Hazard Rate. Assuming that D is a product distribution is also
extremely common (e.g. Myerson [1981]; Chawla, Hartline, and Kleinberg [2007]; Chawla, Hartline,
Malec, and Sivan [2010]), and corresponds to the property that a consumer’s value for one plan does
not influence the probability of their value for another. While this assumption may initially appear
restrictive, numerous works establish that results proved in this setting generally extend to richer
settings as well. Indeed, our results immediately extend, for free, to the “common base-value” model
of Chawla, Malec, and Sivan [2015],5 but we focus on the independent setting for ease of exposition
(see Section 5 for details on this particular extension). Assuming that D is symmetric corresponds
to the following: individuals may certainly have distinct values for distinct plans. The fact that D
is symmetric simply means that a priori there is nothing special about one plan versus another.
Free Market Setting: In the free market setting, each provider i sets a price pi on their plan.
A consumer drawn from D purchases the plan i∗ = argmaxi{vi − pi}. Importantly, notice that
the consumer must purchase a plan, even if vi < pi for all i. So provider i’s payoff is equal to
pi · Pr~v←D[i = argmaxj{vj − pj}].6 A best response of provider i to ~p−i, where −i denotes all
agents other than i, is the payoff-maximizing price in response to ~p−i. A price vector ~p is a pure
equilibrium if each provider is simultaneously best responding. An equilibrium ~p is symmetric if
pi = pj for all i, j. Observe that when both D and ~p are symmetric, the payoff to each provider is
just pi/n.
Limited Entry Setting: The focus of this paper is contrasting the Free Market setting with a
“Limited Entry” setting. In the Limited Entry setting, the regulator does not exert total control over
the market (e.g. by directly setting prices), but simply restricts entry to the market. Specifically,
each provider i first sets a price pi on their plan, and then the market regulator selects a subset
S of k < n providers to enter according to a pre-specified rule based only on the relative ordering
of the pis (note that we require the regulator to always kick out at least one provider, so that
the Free Market setting is not a special case of Limited Entry).7 A consumer drawn from D
purchases the plan i∗ = argmaxi∈S{vi − pi}. Again, the consumer must purchase a plan in S,
even if vi < pi for all i ∈ S. Provider i’s payoff is 0 if they are not selected to be in S, or equal
to pi · Pr~v←D[i = argmaxj∈S{vj − pj}] otherwise. A price vector ~p is again an equilibrium if each
provider is simultaneously best responding, and symmetric if pi = pj for all i, j.
It is not hard to see when D is symmetric that among all selection rules, and all equilibria of
those rules, the one which results in highest consumer utility is to take the k = n− 1 providers who
set the lowest prices (tie-breaking randomly), due to the following observation. As a result, we will
simply refer to this particular rule as “the” Limited Entry setting, and study only this rule for the
rest of the paper.
5In the common base-value model, each consumer has a “base value” for all plans, and an idiosynchratic value for
each plan separately. Their value for a plan sums these two together.
6Observe also that because each Di has a PDF, ties occur with probability 0, and there is always a unique argmax.
As a result, we will not be careful between ≤ and < when discussing preferences.
7If the rule can depend on the prices themselves, then the regulator can effectively set the market prices directly
by kicking everyone out of the market unless they set the desired prices.
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Observation 1. For all symmetric D, the unique equilibrium in the Limited Entry setting is ~p = ~0.
This is because the losing provider earns no profit and is better off undercutting. The same is
true for the next losing provider, and so on, until the prices reach ~0.
Consumer Utility: The focus of this paper is understanding the expected consumer utility in
equilibrium for both settings. Specifically, the expected consumer welfare is equal to E~v←D[vi∗ , i∗ =
argmaxi{vi − pi}], where the argmax is taken over i ∈ [n] in the free market setting, or i ∈ S in
the Limited Entry setting. That is, the expected welfare is simply the expected value a consumer
receives for the plan they purchase. The expected revenue is simply the sum of the providers’
payoffs. Consumer utility is then just welfare minus revenue. Recall again that consumers can not
opt out, and some consumers may indeed get negative utility.
2.1. Distributional Properties
Symmetric equilibria do not always exist for symmetric distributions (Proposition 1.5), and limiting
entry does not universally increase or decrease consumer utility compared to the Free Market setting
(also Proposition 1.5). As such, the focus of this paper is in providing sufficient conditions for (e.g.)
(1) equilibria to exist, and (2) limiting entry to improve consumer utility. Below are properties of
single-variate distributions which we’ll use. The first two are standard in the literature. MHR+ is
a new condition we introduce which is a proper subset of MHR (see Observation 2), and happens
to be “the right” restriction of MHR for our setting. For all definitions below, “non-decreasing”
means “non-decreasing over the support of F ,” and “for all x” means “for all x in the support of F .”
Modulo our new MHR+, each of these conditions are common assumptions in past work (e.g. Bulow
and Klemperer [1994]; Pai and Vohra [2014]). In typical applications, regularity (or at least MHR)
suffice for desired positive results to hold. Proposition 1.5 establishes, perhaps surprisingly, that
MHR doesn’t suffice in our setting, motivating the MHR+ definition.
Definition 2.1 (Regular). A one-dimensional distribution with CDF F and PDF f is regular if
for all x, x− 1−F (x)f(x) is monotone non-decreasing.
Definition 2.2 (Monotone Hazard Rate (MHR)). A one-dimensional distribution with CDF F and
PDF f is MHR if for all x, the hazard rate hF (x) :=
f(x)
1−F (x) is monotone non-decreasing.
The following condition is new to this work. Note that f ′(x) denotes ddxf(x). The same is true
for the notation ′ throughout.
Definition 2.3 (MHR+). A one-dimensional distribution with CDF F and PDF f is MHR+ if
there exists a constant c ≥ 0 such that cf(x) ≥ −f ′(x) and hF (x) ≥ c for all x.
Definition 2.4 (Decreasing Density). A one-dimensional distribution with CDF F and PDF f has
decreasing density if f(·) is non-increasing.
The following observation provides several equivalent conditions for the above definitions. In
particular, the second condition concerning MHR (4) and the second condition concerning MHR+(6)
establish how MHR+distributions are MHR distributions “plus a little extra.”
Observation 2. The definitions above are equivalent to the following conditions:
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1. A distribution is regular iff 2f(x)2 ≥ −f ′(x)(1− F (x)) for all x.
2. A distribution is regular iff 2f(x)hF (x) ≥ −f ′(x) for all x.
3. A distribution is MHR iff f(x)2 ≥ −f ′(x)(1− F (x)) for all x.
4. A distribution is MHR iff f(x)hF (x) ≥ −f ′(x) for all x.
5. A distribution is MHR+ iff it is MHR and f(x)f(0) ≥ −f ′(x) for all x.
6. A distribution is MHR+ iff it is MHR and f(x)hF (0) ≥ −f ′(x) for all x.
7. A distribution is MHR+ iff f(x)f(0) ≥ −f ′(x) and hF (x) ≥ f(0) for all x.
Proof. The first four conditions follow immediately from taking the derivative of a non-decreasing
function, and ensuring that it is ≥ 0 (and plugging in the definition of hF (·)). The fifth/sixth
conditions are equivalent as 1 − F (0) = 1, so we just need to confirm that they follow from the
definition of MHR+ and the earlier conditions. Indeed, if a distribution is MHR+, then it is clearly
MHR (by (4)). Also, as hF (0) ≥ c, and cf(x) ≥ −f ′(x) for all x, then f(x)hF (0) ≥ −f ′(x) for all
x. Similarly, if a distribution satisfies (6), define c := hF (0) = f(0). Then clearly cf(x) ≥ −f ′(x)
immediately from (6), and also because the distribution is MHR, we have hF (x) ≥ hF (0) = c for
all x, so the distribution is MHR+.
Finally to see that (7) implies MHR+, observe that f(0) ≥ 0 is the desired c for the definition of
MHR+. Also, any distribution that satisfies (6) clearly has f(x)f(0) ≥ −f ′(x) (as f(0) = hF (0)).
And, as distributions satisfying (6) are MHR, we also have hF (x) ≥ hF (0) = f(0), as desired.
We will use condition (3) for MHR and (7) for MHR+several times throughout the proofs in
Sections 3 and 6. See Figure 1 for examples of distributions in each class.
Figure 1: Recall that MHR+ ⊂ MHR ⊂ regular. The above shows examples of regular-only, MHR-
but-not-MHR+, and MHR+distributions. Note that essentially every MHR distribution is also
MHR+except for those explicitly constructed so as not to be. The Fε,k distribution can be found
in Appendix C.
Finally, we’ll use the following notation for many of our theorem statements.
Definition 2.5 (Expected Order Statistics). For a single-variate distribution with CDF F , define:
• Xni (F ) to be a random variable which is the i
th highest of n i.i.d. draws from F .
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• V ni (F ) to be the expected value of the i
th highest of n i.i.d. draws from F . That is, V ni (F ) :=
E[Xni (F )].
• hni (F ) to be the expected hazard rate of the i
th highest of n i.i.d. draws from F . That is,
hni (F ) := E
[
f(Xni (F ))
1−F (Xni (F ))
]
. Note that the definition inside the expectation is intentional: we
first find the ith highest sample, and then compute its hazard rate with respect to the original
F, f .
• Hni (F ) to be the expected inverse hazard rate of the i
th highest of n i.i.d. draws from F . That
is, Hni (F ) := E
[
1−F (Xni (F ))
f(Xni (F ))
]
.
2.2. Virtual Value Preliminaries
A tool that we’ll repeatedly use throughout our results is the Myersonian theory of virtual val-
ues Myerson [1981].
Definition 2.6 (Virtual value). For a single-dimensional distribution with CDF F and PDF f ,
define the virtual value with respect to F as ϕF (·), with ϕF (v) := v − 1−F (v)f(v) .
Note also that ϕF (v) = v − 1hF (v) . The inverse of ϕF (v) is well-defined when ϕF (v) is non-
decreasing, and unique when strictly increasing.
Theorem 2.1 (Myerson [1981]). The following conditions hold
• Let F be regular. Then ϕF (·) is monotone non-decreasing, and argmaxp{p · (1 − F (p))} =
ϕ−1F (0). Observe that ϕ
−1
F (0) is the set of all v such that v = 1/hF (v).
• If F is not regular, it is still the case that q := argmaxp{p · (1− F (p))} satisfies ϕF (q) = 0.8
• Finally, for all n and F , E[Xn2 (F )] = E[ϕF (Xn1 (F ))].9
Observation 3. Let F be MHR. Then argmaxp{p · (1− F (p))} is unique.
Proof. Observe that v is strictly increasing in v, and 1/hF (v) is weakly decreasing in v. Therefore,
v = 1/hF (v) cannot have multiple solutions.
3. Best Responding in the Free Market Setting
In this section, we expand on the mathematics behind what it means to best-respond in the Free
Market setting. Importantly, recall that every consumer must select a provider, even if their utility
for each is negative. Our focus is on the symmetric case (D is symmetric, searching for a symmetric
equilibrium). In Section 6 we consider extensions to the asymmetric case.
Consider the search for a symmetric equilibrium. The question we need to ask is “given that the
n−1 other providers are setting price p, is p a best response for the remaining provider?” To resolve
this, we first need to understand more precisely the payoff received by the remaining provider for
setting price q while the other n− 1 set price p.
8For readers not familiar with this particular claim, it follows by observing that ϕF (q) = 0 is exactly the first-order
condition for maximizing the revenue curve of F .
9This follows from the equivalence of expected virtual surplus and expected revenue. The expected revenue of the
second-price auction with n bidders is the LHS, and the expected virtual value of the winner is the RHS.
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Definition 3.1 (Star Operation). Let F ∗p (q) be such that when all providers j 6= i are setting
price p, and provider i sets price q, the probability that the consumer purchases from provider i is
1− F ∗p (q). That is, the payoff to provider i in this circumstance is q(1− F ∗p (q)).
Our choice of notation suggests that we will reason about best-responding as a single-item
revenue problem, with the consumer’s value distribution defined by F ∗p . Our goal will be to find
sufficient conditions for there to exist a p such that p itself is the revenue-maximizing price for the
distribution F ∗p . Our plan is roughly as follows:
• Write an expression for ϕF ∗p (·).
• Observe that ϕF ∗p (p) = 0 is necessary for p to possibly be a symmetric equilibrium, by first-
order conditions (Theorem 2.1). Show that this equation has a unique solution.
• If F ∗p is regular or MHR, then first-order conditions suffice for p = ϕ
−1
F ∗p
(0) to be a best
response, and therefore p is indeed a symmetric equilibrium (but this is not necessary for p
to be a symmetric equilibrium).
• Prove that if F is MHR+ with decreasing density, then F ∗p is MHR.
Let’s quickly highlight some aspects of this plan. Typically, finding a closed form for potential
equilibria, and establishing that sufficient conditions hold is a matter of solving systems of non-linear
equations. Often, this process may be mathematically engaging, but not offer insight connecting
the sufficient conditions to the conclusions. The final step of our outline (that MHR+ F implies
MHR F ∗p ) is still mostly “just math;” however, the rest of the outline leverages existing theory of
Myersonian virtual values to make the rest of the math more intuitive.
Let’s now begin by writing an analytical expression for F ∗p (q), f∗p (q), and (f∗)′p(q). This will
let us (a) compute the virtual value ϕF ∗p (q) and (b) check whether F
∗
p is regular or MHR. Recall
that 1 − F ∗p (q) is the probability that the consumer chooses to purchase from a provider priced at
q when the other n− 1 are priced at p. Below, observe that gp(q, x) is the density of the maximum
of n− 1 draws from F , after adding p and subtracting q.
Proposition 3.1. Let gp(q, x) := (n−1)f(x−q+p)(F (x−q+p))n−2. Let also M := max{0, q−p}.
• F ∗p (q) =
∫∞
M F (x)gp(q, x)dx.
• 1− F ∗p (q) =
∫∞
M (1− F (x))gp(q, x)dx+ F (M + p− q)n−1.
• f∗p (q) =
∫∞
M f(x)gp(q, x)dx.
• (f∗p )′(q) =
∫∞
M (f
′(x))gp(q, x)dx+ f(0)gp(q,M).
Note that the definitions in Proposition 3.1 are referred to many times throughout the proofs of
Propositions 3.2 and 3.3; the reader may want to keep them handy. The proof of Proposition 3.1
appears in Appendix A.
The following describes a condition that must be met as a result of first-order conditions in order
to possibly have a symmetric equilibrium in the Free Market setting. Note that this holds for any
F , even those which are not MHR or regular.
Proposition 3.2. Let D := Fn. The only possible symmetric equilibrium in the Free Market setting
is pF := 1hn2 (F ) . If F
∗
pF
is regular, then 1hn2 (F ) is a symmetric equilibrium.
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Proof. By Theorem 2.1 and the definition of F ∗p , in order for p to be a best response to all other
providers setting price p, we must have ϕF ∗p (p) = 0. Note that this does not guarantee that p is a
best response; this is just a necessary first-order condition.
Observe that, using Proposition 3.1, many of the terms in F ∗p (q) (and f∗p (q)) simplify when
p = q, so we get:
ϕF ∗p (p) = p−
1− F ∗p (p)
f∗p (p)
= p−
∫∞
0 (1− F (x))(n− 1)f(x)F (x)n−2dx∫∞
0 f(x)(n− 1)f(x)F (x)n−2dx
.
Let’s first examine the numerator. The numerator integrates over all x, the density f(x),
times the probability that exactly one of n − 1 other draws from F exceed x (this is (n − 1)(1 −
F (x))F (x)n−2). This is exactly the probability that one of n draws is the second-highest, which
is just 1/n. Another way to see that 1 − F ∗p (p) = 1/n is just that 1 − F ∗p (p), by definition, is the
probability that a particular one of n providers is the consumer’s favorite. But as D is symmetric,
and the price p is the same for all providers, this is just 1/n. So now we wish to examine the
denominator, with an extra factor of n from the numerator:∫ ∞
0
n(n− 1)f(x)2F (x)n−2dx =
∫ ∞
0
n(n− 1)hF (x)f(x)F (x)n−2(1− F (x))dx.
All we have done above is multiply and divide by 1−F (x). But now the integral is interpretable:
we are integrating over all x, the number of ways to choose an ordered pair (a, b) of n draws (n(n−1)),
times the density of va at x (this is f(x)), times the probability that vb exceeds x (1−F (x)), times
the probability that the remaining n − 2 items do not exceed x (F (x)n−2), times the hazard rate
at x. This is exactly computing the expected hazard rate of the second-highest of n draws from F !
Therefore, we immediately conclude that:
ϕF ∗p (p) = p−
1
hn2 (F )
,
and therefore ϕF ∗p (p) = 0 iff p = 1/h
n
2 (F ). Importantly, note that we have proven that for all
p, even those which are not equilibria, or otherwise related to F , that ϕF ∗p (p) = p− 1hn2 (F ) .
So at this point, we know know the unique candidate for a symmetric equilibrium (because it
is the only candidate which satisfies first-order conditions of Theorem 2.1). If we can find sufficient
conditions for F ∗p to be regular (or MHR), then these first-order conditions suffice for 1/hn2 (F )
to indeed be a symmetric equilibrium. We identify such sufficient conditions below (remember
that Proposition 1.5 establishes that MHR alone does not suffice, so some stronger conditions are
necessary):
Proposition 3.3. Let F be MHR+ and have decreasing density. Then for all p, F ∗p is MHR.
Proof. Lets first develop intuition for why MHR+ is a convenient condition for reasoning about the
starred distribution. Observe that each of the starred CDF/PDF/etc. functions are convolutions of
the original CDF/PDF/etc. with gp(q, x). Unfortunately, just knowing that, for example, f ′(x)(1−
F (x)) ≤ f(x)2 for all x (which is guaranteed by MHR from Observation 2 (3)) is not enough for us
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to reason about these convolutions. But MHR+ buys us something stronger, which is exactly what’s
needed for the first half of the proof: not only is −f ′(x)(1 − F (x)) ≤ f(x)2 for all x, but in fact
−f ′(x) ≤ cf(x) everywhere, which does allow us to make direct substitutions into the convolution.
To see this, consider attempting to manipulate −(f∗p )′(q) using only Obs. 2 (4) for MHR—that
f(x)hF (x) ≥ −f ′(x) for all x—instead of what we use from the definition for MHR+. The second
step of the proof is dealing with the additional terms outside of the integral. Surprisingly, MHR+ also
turns out to be the right condition to reason transparently about these additional terms, although
more creativity is required here than in step one. We now proceed with the proof.
First, observe that if F has decreasing density, then f(0) > 0 (so we may divide by f(0)). Next,
because F is MHR+, recall by Observation 2 condition (7) that we have f(x)f(0) ≥ −f ′(x), and
hF (x) ≥ f(0). Since hF (x) = f(x)/(1−F (x)), this implies that f(x) ≥ f(0)(1−F (x)). Therefore,
we get:
1− F ∗p (q) =
∫ ∞
M
(1− F (x))gp(q, x)dx+ F (M + p− q)n−1 Prop. 3.1: Def. of 1− F ∗p (q)
≤
∫ ∞
M
f(x)
f(0)
gp(q, x)dx+ F (M + p− q)n−1 Obs. 2 (7): f(x) ≥ f(0)(1− F (x))
= f∗p (q)/f(0) + F (M + p− q)n−1. Prop. 3.1: Def. of f∗p (q)
Similarly, we can write:
−(f∗p )′(q) = −
∫ ∞
M
f ′(x)gp(q, x)dx− f(0)gp(q,M) Prop. 3.1: Def. of (f∗p )′(q)
≤
∫ ∞
M
f(x)f(0)gp(q, x)dx− f(0)gp(q,M) Obs. 2 (7): f(x)f(0) ≥ −f ′(x)
≤ f(0)f∗p (q)− f(0)gp(q,M). Prop. 3.1: Def. of f∗p (q)
Therefore, we get:
(1−F ∗p (q)) ·(−f∗p )′(q) ≤ (f∗p (q))2−f(0)gp(q,M) ·(1−F ∗p (q))−F (M+p−q)n−1
∫ ∞
M
f ′(x)gp(q, x)dx.
The above inequality completes the “step one” referenced in the proof summary. Our remaining
task is to show that:
−f(0)gp(q,M) · (1− F ∗p (q))− F (M + p− q)n−1
∫ ∞
M
f ′(x)gp(q, x)dx ≤ 0,
as then we will have established that (1 − F ∗p (q)) · (−f∗p )′(q) ≤ (f∗p (q))2, and therefore F ∗p is
MHR. Observe that this is clearly true when M = q − p, as the entire term above is 0—both
gp(q, q− p) = 0 (as can be seen by plugging it in to its definition or reasoning about the probability
of ties at 0, which has probability 0) and F (0) = 0. So the remaining case is when M = 0. Here,
we derive the following, starting with the justification and then showing the equations.
The first inequality follows by definition of F being MHR+from Observation 2 (7): f(x)f(0) ≥
−f ′(x). The second follows by dividing both sides by f(0)gp(g, 0), which is strictly positive. The
third line follows by evaluating the definition of gp(q, x) from Proposition 3.1.
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The fourth line then follows by multiplying both sides by Fn−1(p − q), which is positive. The
fifth line follows because when M = 0, p > q and F has decreasing density. The penultimate line
follows as F (p− q) ≤ F (x+ p− q) for all x ≥ 0.
The final line follows from the following reasoning. Recall that 1−F ∗p (q) denotes the probability
that the consumer will choose to purchase a specific plan when that plan has price q and all other
plans have price p. The probability that this occurs conditioned on having value x for the specific
plan is the probability that the consumer has utility v − p ≤ x − q for every other plan, or value
v ≤ x+ p− q, which occurs with probability exactly Fn−1(x+ p− q), and the previous term simply
integrates this times f(x) over all x.
−
∫ ∞
0
f ′(x)gp(q, x)dx ≤
∫ ∞
0
f(0)f(x)gp(q, x)dx
⇒ −
∫∞
0 f
′(x)gp(q, x)dx
f(0)gp(q, 0)
≤
∫ ∞
0
f(x)gp(q, x)/gp(q, 0)dx
=
∫ ∞
0
f(x)
(n− 1)f(x+ p− q)Fn−2(x+ p− q)
(n− 1)f(x)Fn−2(p− q) dx
⇒ −F
n−1(p− q) ∫∞0 f ′(x)gp(q, x)dx
f(0)gp(q, 0)
≤ F (p− q)
∫ ∞
0
f(x)
f(x+ p− q)Fn−2(x+ p− q)
f(x)
dx
≤ F (p− q)
∫ ∞
0
f(x)Fn−2(x+ p− q)dx
≤
∫ ∞
0
f(x)Fn−1(x+ p− q)dx
= 1− F ∗p (q).
Finally, observe that this inequality is exactly what we want, as:
−Fn−1(p− q) ∫∞0 f ′(x)gp(q, x)dx
f(0)gp(q, 0)
≤ 1− F ∗p (q)
⇒ −Fn−1(p− q)
∫ ∞
0
f ′(x)gp(q, x)dx ≤ f(0)gp(q,M) · (1− F ∗p (q))
⇒ −f(0)gp(q,M) · (1− F ∗p (q))− F (M + p− q)n−1
∫ ∞
M
f ′(x)gp(q, x)dx ≤ 0
because again, M = 0 in this case.
And now, we can wrap up the proof of Theorem 1.1, which claims that whenever F is MHR+,
the unique symmetric equilibrium in the Free Market setting for D := Fn is for each provider to
set price 1/hn2 (F ).
Proof of Theorem 1.1. Proposition 3.2 establishes that 1/hn2 (F ) is a symmetric equilibrium as long
as F ∗1/hn2 (F ) is regular. Proposition 3.3 proves something even stronger: that F
∗
p is MHR for all p, as
long as F is MHR+ with decreasing density. The two propositions together complete the proof.
Note that Theorem 1.1 accomplishes several tasks:
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• It establishes that a symmetric equilibrium exists subject to MHR+ (which is not generally
true without some assumptions, Proposition 1.5).
• It provides a clean closed form for this symmetric equilibrium.
• It establishes uniqueness of this equilibrium (even stronger: this is the only possible equilib-
rium for all F ). This is important because it lets us reason about “the utility in the Free Market
setting” without needing to worry about exactly which equilibrium we should be analyzing.
4. Comparing Consumer Utilities
In this section, we derive a Limit-Entry condition, which dictates when consumer utility is higher
in the Limited Entry setting versus the Free Market. Note that our condition is well-defined even
when no symmetric equilibrium exists in the Free Market setting. Let’s first recall the Limit-Entry
condition from Section 1, which a distribution satisfies when
Hn1 (F ) ≤ n/hn2 (F ),
where again, Hn1 (F ) is the expected inverse hazard rate of the highest of n i.i.d. draws from F
and hn2 (F ) is the expected hazard rate of the second-highest of n i.i.d. draws from F . Recall that
Theorem 1.2 states that consumer utility is higher in the Limited Entry setting versus the Free
Market setting if and only if the Limit-Entry condition holds. The main result of this section is a
proof of Theorems 1.2, and 1.3.
Proof of Theorem 1.2. Let’s first compute the expected consumer utility in the Limited Entry set-
ting.
Lemma 4.1. The expected consumer utility at the unique equilibrium in the Limited Entry setting
is V n−11 (F ).
Proof. There are a total of n−1 providers, and recall from Observation 1 that the unique equilibrium
has all prices set to 0. Therefore, the consumer’s expected payment is zero. The consumer picks
their favorite plan, with value simply the maximum of n − 1 i.i.d. draws from F . Together, we
see that the consumer’s expected utility at the unique symmetric equilibrium of the Limited Entry
setting is V n−11 (F ).
Now, let’s compute the expected consumer utility in the Free Market setting.
Lemma 4.2. The expected consumer utility at the unique symmetric equilibrium (when it exists) in
the Free Market setting is V n1 (F )− 1/hn2 (F ).
Proof. There are a total of n providers, and the unique symmetric equilibrium (when it exists) has
all prices set to 1/hn2 (F ). Therefore, the consumers expected payment is 1/hn2 (F ) (because the
consumer must purchase a plan, even with negative utility for everything). The consumer’s value
for their favorite plan is the maximum of n i.i.d. draws from F . Therefore, the consumer’s expected
utility at the unique symmetric equilibrium of the Free Market setting is V n1 (F )− 1/hn2 (F ).
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We therefore see that the expected utility is higher in the Limited Entry setting versus Free
Market if and only if V n−11 (F ) ≥ V n1 (F ) − 1/hn2 (F ). The remainder of the proof is rewriting this
condition, using Myersonian virtual value theory in yet another way. We produce the steps below,
and justify each step afterwards. Two of the three steps follow from basic algebra or a coupling
argument. The middle step (line three) makes use of virtual value theory.
V n−11 (F ) ≥ V n1 (F )−
1
hn2 (F )
⇔ n− 1
n
V n1 (F ) +
1
n
V n2 (F ) ≥ V n1 −
1
hn2 (F )
⇔ n− 1
n
V n1 (F ) +
1
n
(V n1 (F )−Hn1 (F )) ≥ V n1 (F )−
1
hn2 (F )
⇔ Hn1 (F ) ≤
n
hn2 (F )
.
The first equivalence follows by a coupling argument. One way to draw the highest of n − 1
draws from F , or Xn−12 (F ), is to take n draws from F , remove one uniformly at random, and then
examine the highest remaining. With probability 1/n, the highest of the n draws is excluded, so
the highest remaining is Xn2 (F ). The rest of the time, a different draw is excluded and the highest
of n remains, giving Xn1 (F ). Hence in expectation, V
n−1
1 (F ) =
n−1
n V
n
1 (F ) +
1
nV
n
2 (F ).
The second equivalence follows from Theorem 2.1, as V n2 (F ) = E[ϕF (Xn1 (F ))]. More familiarly,
this is the fact that a second-price auction is revenue-maximizing, and that the revenue is equal to
the virtual welfare of the highest-valued bidder in the iid setting. Recall that ϕF (v) = v− 1/hF (v);
then E[ϕF (Xn1 (F ))] = V n1 (F )−Hn1 (F ).
The final equivalence follows by subtracting V n1 (F ) from both sides and multiplying by −1.
Finally, we prove Theorem 1.3. Recall that Theorem 1.3 asserts that whenever F is MHR with
decreasing density, it satisfies the Limit-Entry condition. Recall that MHR alone is not enough
to guarantee that there is an equilibrium in the Free Market setting for the Limited Entry setting
to improve over, but that the condition is well-defined anyway. When F is further MHR+, there
is an equilibrium in both settings, and the consumer utility is always higher with Limited Entry
(Corollary 1.4).
Proof of Theorem 1.3. The proof will follow from the steps below (justification for each step is
provided afterwards). If F is MHR with decreasing density, then:
f(0) ≥ E[f(Xn−11 )]
⇔ 1
f(0)
≤ 1
E[f(Xn−11 )]
⇒ 1
hF (0)
≤ n
nE[f(Xn−11 )]
⇒ Hn1 (F ) ≤
n
hn2 (F )
.
The first line follows because F has decreasing density. Therefore f(0) ≥ f(x) for all x, and
certainly f(0) ≥ E[f(X)] for any non-negative random variable X (including Xn−11 ). The second
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line follows by simple algebra. The third line makes two steps. On the LHS, we observe that
f(0) = hF (0), so the left-hand sides are actually identical between the second and third lines. On
the right-hand side, we just multiply the numerator and denominator by n. The final implication
again makes two steps. On the left-hand side, we observe that as F is MHR, 1/hF (0) ≥ 1/hF (x)
for all x ≥ 0. Therefore, 1/hF (0) ≥ E[1/hF (X)] for any non-negative random variable X (including
Xn1 ). On the right-hand side, we have used the equality nE[f(X
n−1
1 )] = h
n
2 (F ), which will be proved
shortly (and complete the proof).
The last line above completes the proof (once we establish the equality): we have shown that
if F is MHR with decreasing density, then the Limit-Entry Condition is satisfied. The remaining
task is to prove Lemma 4.3, below.
Lemma 4.3. h2n(F ) = E[n · f(Xn−11 (F ))].
Proof.
hn2 (F ) =
∫ ∞
0
n(n− 1)f(x)hF (x)F (x)n−2(1− F (x))dx
=
∫ ∞
0
n(n− 1)f(x) · f(x)F (x)n−2dx
= E[n · f(Xn−11 (F ))].
The first line is simply the definition of hn2 (F ). The second line just rewrites hF (x)(1−F (x)) =
f(x). The third line observes that (n− 1)f(x)F (x)n−2dx is the density of Xn−11 (F ). Indeed, there
are n− 1 ways to choose a provider a from n− 1, f(x) is the density of va at x, and F (x)n−2 is the
probability that all n−2 other providers have vi ≤ x. So we are integrating the density of Xn−11 (F )
at x, times f(x) from 0 to ∞. This exactly computes the expected value of f(Xn−11 ). The extra
factor of n is carried through.
5. Extension: Non-Zero Costs and Common Base-Value
In this section, we establish that our previous results hold verbatim when the provider faces a non-
zero cost to provide for the consumer, or in the Common Base-Value model of Chawla et al. [2015].
This section uses standard tricks from auction design to redefine the buyer’s value distribution as the
seller’s profit distribution.Usually, these tricks adjust the distribution of study (e.g. by subtracting
a constant). In our setting, due to the mandatory purchase, they actually have no impact on the
distribution at all, and our results are independent of the (symmetric) per-consumer cost. We begin
by defining non-zero cost.
Definition 5.1 (Non-zero cost). Keep all aspects of the model the same, and additionally define a
cost c that each provider must pay per consumer covered. That is, if a provider covers a y fraction
of the market, and sets price p, that provider’s payoff is (p− c)y.
To see why our model is independent of the cost c, consider the following thought experiment.
Instead of having the providers pay cost c per consumer, tell every consumer that they must pay an
additional c, no matter which provider they choose. Importantly, because purchase is mandatory,
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this additional cost c doesn’t affect the consumer’s decisions at all. So consumer decisions are
exactly the same as in the zero-cost model. Moreover, because providers are paid an additional c
by the consumer to cover the cost, their payoff at a given price vector ~p is exactly the same as if
there were zero cost. We again emphasize that the key difference between our setting and typical
single-item settings (where cost c with value distribution F is equivalent to zero cost with value
distribution F subtracting c) is the mandatory purchase. In single-item sale, the “don’t purchase”
option becomes more attractive when the “purchase” option has cost increased by c. But in our
setting, there is no “don’t purchase” option, and all options uniformly increase in cost by c.
Finally, it is easy to see that any strategy profile ~p in the above-described thought experiment
(where the consumer pays an additional c, independent of choice) is identical to the strategy profile
~p + ~c (i.e. increase all prices by c) if the providers pay cost c per consumer covered. This is again
because the consumer’s choice is invariant under increasing all prices by the same fixed amount.
This allows us to conclude the following:
Proposition 5.1. All previous results stated when the providers have zero cost hold verbatim when
providers have non-zero cost. Specifically:
• If D := Fn has a symmetric equilibrium in the Free Market setting with zero cost, then for
all c, D := Fn has a symmetric equilibrium in the Free Market setting with cost c (and the
equilibrium adds c to all prices).
• If D := Fn admits a symmetric equilibrium in the Free Market setting with zero cost, then for
any c, the expected consumer utility at the unique symmetric equilibrium in the Limited Entry
setting exceeds that at the unique symmetric equilibrium in the Free Market setting if and only
if F satisfies the Limit-Entry Condition.
It is easy to see that all other results for the zero-cost setting extend to any cost c by the above
two bullets. The same conclusions hold for an extension to Common Base-Value distributions as
well. Note that the Common Base-Value setting may be relevant in our motivating example of
health insurance, where a consumer has a base-value for being covered by any insurance at all.
Definition 5.2 (Common Base-Value Chawla et al. [2015]). A consumer’s valuation vector ~v is
drawn from a common base-value distribution D := F0 × Fn if they first draw 〈w0, . . . , wn〉 ← D
and then set vi := w0 + wi.
Similarly to the above reasoning on costs, observe that a consumer with values ~w or with values
~v = ~w+w0 ·~1 will purchase exactly the same plan at prices ~p (again, because “not purchase” is not
an option). Therefore, the common base-value w0 can simply be treated as 0, because it does not
impact any consumer choices, and all previous results immediately extend to this model as well.
Proposition 5.2. All previous results stated when the consumers are drawn from a product dis-
tribution hold verbatim when consumers are instead drawn from a common base-value distribution.
Specifically:
• If D := Fn has a symmetric equilibrium in the Free Market setting, then for all base-value
distributions F0, D′ := F0 × Fn has a symmetric equilibrium in the Free Market setting. (It’s
the same equilibrium.)
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• If D := Fn admits a symmetric equilibrium in the Free Market setting, then for all base-value
distributions F0, the expected consumer utility at the unique symmetric equilibrium in the
Limited Entry setting for D′ := F0 × Fn exceeds that at the unique symmetric equilibrium in
the Free Market setting for D′ := F0×Fn if and only if F satisfies the Limit-Entry Condition.
6. Extension: Asymmetric Distributions
In this section, we extend our results on equilibria in the Free Market setting to asymmetric distri-
butions. Here, we only prove existence results for certain kinds of equilibria rather than closed form
solutions, hence it would not be possible to extend the Limit-Entry Condition without a significantly
different approach. To be clear: we are in exactly the same model as the rest of the paper, but no
longer assuming that D is symmetric. We will still aim for sufficient conditions for a symmetric
equilibrium to exist, but our extensions hold for restricted cases. Many of the lemmas in this section
hold for general n, and we will state them as such.
The structure of this section will closely parallel that of Section 3, and the proofs follow similar
intuition with additional technical work. We begin by updating the definition of the star operation.
Definition 6.1 (Star Operation). Let F ∗i,~p−i(q) be such that when each provider j 6= i sets price pj,
and provider i sets price q, the probability that the consumer purchases from provider i is 1−F ∗i,~p−i(q).
That is, the payoff to provider i in this circumstance is q(1− F ∗i,~p−i(q)).
As in Section 3, we now compute F ∗i,~p−i(q) (and the related quantities). A proof is provided in
Appendix B.
Proposition 6.1. Let gi,~p−i(q, x) :=
∑
j 6=i fj(x − q + pj)
∏
k/∈{i,j} Fk(x − q + pk). Let also M :=
max{0, q −minj 6=i{pj}}. Then:
• F ∗i,~p−i(q) =
∫∞
M Fi(x)gi,~p−i(q, x)dx.
• 1− F ∗i,~p−i(q) =
∫∞
M (1− Fi(x))gi,~p−i(q, x)dx+
∏
j 6=i Fj(M +minj 6=i{pj} − q).
• f∗i,~p−i(q) =
∫∞
M fi(x)gi,~p−i(q, x)dx.
• (f∗i,~p−i)
′(q) =
∫∞
M (f
′
i(x))gi,~p−i(q, x)dx+ fi(0)gi,~p−i(q,M).
Like in Section 3, we establish that if Fi is MHR+ and decreasing density, then F ∗i,~p−i is MHR,
for all ~p−i.
Proposition 6.2. Let Fi be MHR+ and decreasing density. Then for all ~p−i, F ∗i,~p−i is MHR.
The proof parallels that of Proposition 3.3, and can also be found in Appendix B. Finally, we use
this proposition to establish that an equilibrium exists for all two-provider instances with MHR+
marginals.
Theorem 6.3. Let F1, F2 be MHR+. Then there exists a pure equilibrium for D := F1 × F2.
Proof. The proof will proceed by applying Brouwer’s fixed point theorem. There are two high-level
steps. First, we must establish that the best-response function for player i (responding to a price
set by the other player) is well-defined and continuous (Lemma 6.4). Second, we must establish
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that it maps a compact domain to itself. The first step is fairly straight-forward, while the second
step requires some creativity (and indeed the second step is messy to extend beyond two providers).
We establish the first half of the proof for general n. We begin first by establishing that the best
response function qi(·) is continuous for all i when F ∗i,~p−i is MHR.
Lemma 6.4. Let F ∗i,~p−i be MHR for all ~p−i. Then the best response function qi(·) which takes as
input ~p−i and outputs the best response price for provider i is continuous.
Proof. Because F ∗i,~p−i is MHR for all ~p−i, we can actually write a closed form for the best re-
sponse function qi(~p−i). Indeed, because there is a unique q satisfying the first order conditions of
ϕF ∗
i,~p−i
(q) = 0, this is the best response. We can therefore write:
qi(~p−i) = (ϕF ∗
i,~p−i
)−1(0),
recalling from Proposition 6.1 that:
ϕF ∗
i,~p−i
(q) := q − 1−
∫∞
M Fi(x)gi,~p−i(q, x)dx∫∞
M fi(x)gi,~p−i(q, x)dx
,
where M = max{0, q −minj 6=i{pj}} and gi,~p−i(q, x) =
∑
j 6=i fj(x− q + pj)
∏
k/∈{i,j} Fk(x− q + pk).
As F ∗i,~p−i is MHR, observe that ϕF ∗i,~p−i (·) is monotone strictly increasing, and also continuous (in
fact, it is also differentiable). Therefore, the inverse is well-defined, and also continuous (in fact,
differentiable).
Observe that our function qi(·) is exactly the function which takes as input ~p−i and outputs the
q such that ϕF ∗
i,~p−i
(q) = 0. As we have noted that ϕF ∗
i,~p−i
(·) is continuous, qi(·) is continuous as
well, by the implicit function theorem.
Now, we want to consider the function ~q(·) which takes as input a price vector ~p and outputs
〈qi(~p−i)〉i∈[n]. This function is continuous, since each coordinate is continuous. We just want to
show that it maps a compact region to itself, and then Brouwer’s fixed point theorem will establish
that an equilibrium exists.
So our plan is to find a value T such that for all i, pi ≤ T , qi(~p) ≤ T as well (from here, we will
abuse notation and let qi(~p) denote the ith coordinate of our vector-valued function ~q(~p), which is
also equal to the afore-defined qi(~p−i)). We begin with the following observation.
Observation 4. Let F ∗i,~p−i be MHR, and let
1−F ∗i,~p−i (x)
f∗
i,~p−i (x)
≤ x. Then qi(~p) ≤ x.
Proof. Clearly, ϕF ∗
i,~p−i
(x) = x− 1−F
∗
i,~p−i (x)
f∗
i,~p−i (x)
≥ 0. Because ϕF ∗
i,~p−i
(·) is monotone increasing, it means
that qi(~p) = (ϕF ∗
i,~p−i
)−1(0) ≤ x.
Corollary 6.5. Let n = 2. Then ∂qi(~p)/∂pj ≥ 0 when i 6= j.
Proof. Crucially, observe that gi,p+ε(q + ε, x) = gi,p(q, x) for all x, p, q, ε. Therefore,
1−F ∗i,p(q)
f∗i,p(q)
=
1−F ∗i,p+ε(q+ε)
f∗i,p+ε(q+ε)
. This should be intuitive: if all prices increase by ε, then all of the probabilities of sale
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stay the same. This immediately implies that:
qi(~p) =
1− F ∗i,p(qi(~p))
f∗i,p(qi(~p))
=
1− F ∗i,p+ε(qi(~p) + ε)
f∗i,p+ε(qi(~p) + ε)
≤ 1− F
∗
i,p+ε(qi(~p))
f∗i,p+ε(qi(~p))
The last inequality follows as 1/hF ∗i,p+ε(qi(~p) + ε) ≤ 1/hF ∗i,p+ε(qi(~p)) since F ∗i,p is MHR for any p.
Let’s see now what the last line implies. It means certainly that ϕF ∗i,p+ε(qi(~p)) ≤ 0, and therefore
(ϕF ∗i,p+ε)
−1(0) ≥ qi(~p). We therefore conclude that qi(~p) is weakly increasing with respect to the
non-i coordinate, proving the corollary.
Corollary 6.5 establishes qi(~p) is non-decreasing in the other provider’s price, and further, that
when ~p ∈ [0, T ]2, then qi(~p) is maximized when pj = T for j 6= i, and that qi(~p) ≤ 1−F
∗
i,T (T )
f∗i,T (T )
. Then
to conclude that we map a compact region to itself, we just need to show that
1−F ∗i,T (T )
f∗i,T (T )
≤ T .
Lemma 6.6. For any n, let F ∗i,~p−i be MHR for all i, ~p−i. Let also T ≥
1−F ∗
i,~0
(0)
f∗
i,~0
(0) . Then T ≥
1−F ∗
i,T ·~1(T )
f∗
i,T ·~1(T )
.
Proof. Observe that in fact
1−F ∗
i,T ·~1(T )
f∗
i,T ·~1(T )
is independent of T . To see this, recall that F ∗
i,T ·~1(T ) concerns
only the probability that the consumer purchases provider i when all prices are T (and f∗
i,T ·~1(T ) is
its derivative with respect to pi). Observe, however, that because the buyer must purchase an option
even when their utility is negative for everything, that this probability is completely independent
of T . Therefore, this is actually equal to
1−F ∗
i,~0
(0)
f∗
i,~0
(0) , which is just some finite number. Whenever
T ≥ 1−F
∗
i,~0
(0)
f∗
i,~0
(0) , the condition is satisfied.
Finally, we may now simply set T := maxi∈{1,2}{
1−F ∗
i,~0
(0)
f∗
i,~0
(0) } to guarantee that it is at least as
large as both. By the work above, ~q(·) maps [0, T ]2 to [0, T ]2, and is continuous. Therefore it has a
fixed point by Brouwer’s fixed point theorem, which is exactly a pure equilibrium.
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A. Omitted Proofs from Section 3
Proposition 3.1. Let gp(q, x) := (n−1)f(x−q+p)(F (x−q+p))n−2. Let also M := max{0, q−p}.
• F ∗p (q) =
∫∞
M F (x)gp(q, x)dx.
• 1− F ∗p (q) =
∫∞
M (1− F (x))gp(q, x)dx+ F (M + p− q)n−1.
• f∗p (q) =
∫∞
M f(x)gp(q, x)dx.
• (f∗p )′(q) =
∫∞
M (f
′(x))gp(q, x)dx+ f(0)gp(q,M).
Proof. For the first bullet, F ∗p (q) denotes the probability that the consumer does not have highest
utility for the lone provider (n) setting price q. Observe that gp(q, x) is the derivative of F (x− q+
p)n−1 with respect to x. If X := maxi≤n−1{vi} + q − p denotes the random variable that draws
n− 1 times from F and takes the maximum, then adds q − p, then F (x− q + p)n−1 is the CDF of
X, so gp(q, x) is the PDF of X. Observe also that the consumer will not purchase from the lone
provider setting price q iff vn − q ≤ maxi≤n−1{vi} − p⇔ vn ≤ maxi≤n−1{vi}+ q − p⇔ vn ≤ X.
One way to compute the probability that vn ≤ X is to integrate over all possible values of X (x),
the density of X at x times the probability that vn does not exceed x. When x < 0, the probability
that vn does not exceed x is 0. When x < q − p, the density of X at x is 0. So we may restrict
the integral to the range [M,∞). Finally, F (x) is exactly the probability that vn does not exceed
x, and gp(q, x) is exactly the density of X at x, yielding the first bullet.
For the second bullet, observe that
∫∞
M gp(q, x)dx is integrating the density of some random
variable from M to ∞. This random variable is supported on q − p to ∞. So if M = q − p, the
integral is 1, and we have that:
1− F ∗p (q) = 1−
∫ ∞
M
F (x)gp(q, x)dx =
∫ ∞
M
(1− F (x))gp(q, x)dx
If M = 0, then the integral isn’t necessarily 1, but is instead 1− F (p− q)n−1, so an additional
F (p−q)n−1 needs to be added. Observe that F (M+p−q)n−1 = 0 when M 6= 0, and is F (p−q)n−1
otherwise, as desired.
For the third bullet, we apply Leibniz’ integral rule, and take the derivative of F ∗p (q) with
respect to q. The derivative of ∞ with respect to q is 0, and the derivative of M with respect to q
is I(M > 0). So we get that:
f∗p (q) =
∫ ∞
M
F (x)
∂gp(q, x)
∂q
dx− I(M > 0)F (M)gp(q,M).
Doing integration by parts, with u := F (x) and dv := ∂gp(q,x)∂q dx, and observing, crucially, that
∂gp(q,x)
∂q = −∂gp(q,x)∂x (so du = f(x)dx and v = −gp(q, x)), we get:
f∗p (q) = F (x)gp(q, x)|∞M +
∫ ∞
M
f(x)gp(q, x)dx− I(M > 0)F (M)gp(q,M).
f∗p (q) =
∫ ∞
M
f(x)gp(q, x)dx+ F (M)gp(q,M)− I(M > 0)F (M)gp(q,M).
Finally, observe that if M > 0, the terms at the right cancel. if M = 0, both terms are 0 (and
still cancel).
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For the fourth bullet, we again apply Leibniz’ integral rule, and take the derivative with respect
to q. We get:
(f∗)′p(q) =
∫ ∞
M
f(x)
∂gp(q, x)
∂q
dx− I(M > 0)f(M)gp(q,M).
Again doing integration by parts, with u := f(x) and dv := ∂gp(q,x)∂q dx (so du = f
′(x)dx,
v = −gp(q, x)), we get:
(f∗)′p(q) = f(x)gp(q, x)|∞M +
∫ ∞
M
f ′(x)gp(q, x)dx− I(M > 0)f(M)gp(q,M).
(f∗)′p(q) =
∫ ∞
M
f(x)gp(q, x)dx+ f(M)gp(q,M)− I(M > 0)f(M)gp(q,M).
Finally, observe that if M > 0, then the right two terms cancel. If M = 0, then we’re left
with f(0)gp(q,M). Observe that when M 6= 0, gp(q,M) = 0, so the added term in the proposition
statement is correct.
B. Omitted Proofs from Section 6
Proposition 6.1. Let gi,~p−i(q, x) :=
∑
j 6=i fj(x − q + pj)
∏
k/∈{i,j} Fk(x − q + pk). Let also M :=
max{0, q −minj 6=i{pj}}. Then:
• F ∗i,~p−i(q) =
∫∞
M Fi(x)gi,~p−i(q, x)dx.
• 1− F ∗i,~p−i(q) =
∫∞
M (1− Fi(x))gi,~p−i(q, x)dx+
∏
j 6=i Fj(M +minj 6=i{pj} − q).
• f∗i,~p−i(q) =
∫∞
M fi(x)gi,~p−i(q, x)dx.
• (f∗i,~p−i)
′(q) =
∫∞
M (f
′
i(x))gi,~p−i(q, x)dx+ fi(0)gi,~p−i(q,M).
Proof. For the first bullet, F ∗i,~p−i(q) denotes the probability that the consumer does not have highest
utility for the provider i setting price q. Observe that gi,~p−i(q, x) is the derivative of
∏
k 6=i Fk(x −
q + pk) with respect to x. If X := maxj 6=i{vj + q − pj} + q − p denotes the random variable that
draws from each of Fj (j 6= i), then adds q − pj and takes the maximum, then
∏
k 6=i Fk(x− q + pk)
is the CDF of X, so gi,~p−i(q, x) is the PDF of X. Observe also that the consumer will not purchase
from provider i iff vi − q ≤ maxj 6=i{vj − pi} ⇔ vi ≤ maxj 6=i{vj + q − pj} ⇔ vi ≤ X.
One way to compute the probability that vi ≤ X is to integrate over all possible values of X (x),
the density of X at x times the probability that vi does not exceed x. When x < 0, the probability
that vi does not exceed x is 0. When x < minj 6=i{pj − q}, the density of X at x is 0. So we may
restrict the integral to the range [M,∞). Finally, Fi(x) is exactly the probability that vi does not
exceed x, and gp,~p−i(q, x) is exactly the density of X at x, yielding the first bullet.
For the second bullet, observe that
∫∞
M gi,~p−i(q, x)dx is integrating the density of some random
variable from M to ∞. This random variable is supported on q − minj 6=i{pj} to ∞. So if M =
q −minj 6=i{pj}, the integral is 1, and we have that:
1− F ∗i,~p−i(q) = 1−
∫ ∞
M
Fi(x)gi,~p−i(q, x)dx =
∫ ∞
M
(1− Fi(x))gi,~p−i(q, x)dx
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If M = 0, then the integral isn’t necessarily 1, but is instead 1 −∏j 6=i Fj(minj 6=i{pj} − q), so
an additional
∏
j 6=i Fj(minj 6=i{pj} − q) term needs to be added. Observe that when M = 0, this
is exactly the term added in the statement. When M = q −minj 6=i{pj}, the added term is 0 (and
should be 0, by above).
For the third bullet, we apply Leibniz’ integral rule, and take the derivative of F ∗i,~p−i(q) with
respect to q. The derivative of ∞ with respect to q is 0, and the derivative of M with respect to q
is I(M > 0). So we get that:
f∗i,~p−i(q) =
∫ ∞
M
Fi(x)
∂gi,~p−i(q, x)
∂q
dx− I(M > 0)Fi(M)gi,~p−i(q,M).
Doing integration by parts, with u := Fi(x) and dv :=
∂gi,~p−i (q,x)
∂q dx, and observing, crucially,
that
∂gi,~p−i (q,x)
∂q = −
∂gi,~p−i (q,x)
∂x (so du = fi(x)dx and v = −gi,~p−i(q, x)), we get:
f∗i,~p−i(q) = Fi(x)gi,~p−i(q, x)|∞M +
∫ ∞
M
fi(x)gi,~p−i(q, x)dx− I(M > 0)Fi(M)gi,~p−i(q,M).
f∗i (q) =
∫ ∞
M
fi(x)gi,~p−i(q, x)dx+ Fi(M)gi,~p−i(q,M)− I(M > 0)Fi(M)gi,~p−i(q,M).
Finally, observe that if M > 0, the terms at the right cancel. if M = 0, both terms are 0 (and
still cancel).
For the fourth bullet, we again apply Leibniz’ integral rule, and take the derivative with respect
to q. We get:
(f∗)′i,~p−i(q) =
∫ ∞
M
fi(x)
∂gi,~p−i(q, x)
∂q
dx− I(M > 0)fi(M)gi,~p−i(q,M).
Again doing integration by parts, with u := fi(x) and dv :=
∂gi,~p−i (q,x)
∂q dx (so du = f
′
i(x)dx,
v = −gi,~p−i(q, x)), we get:
(f∗)′i(q) = fi(x)gi,~p−i(q, x)|∞M +
∫ ∞
M
f ′i(x)gi,~p−i(q, x)dx− I(M > 0)fi(M)gi,~p−i(q,M).
(f∗)′i,~p−i(q) =
∫ ∞
M
fi(x)gi,~p−i(q, x)dx+ fi(M)gi,~p−i(q,M)− I(M > 0)fi(M)gi,~p−i(q,M).
Finally, observe that if M > 0, then the right two terms cancel. If M = 0, then we’re left with
fi(0)gi,~p−i(q,M). Observe that when M 6= 0, gi,~p−i(q,M) = 0, so the added term in the proposition
statement is correct.
We continue with another missing proof that parallels Section 6.
Proposition 6.2. Let Fi be MHR+ and decreasing density. Then for all ~p−i, F ∗i,~p−i is MHR.
Proof. First, observe that if Fi has decreasing density, then fi(0) > 0 (so we may divide by fi(0)).
Next, recall by Observation 2 that we have fi(x)fi(0) ≥ −f ′i(x), and hFi(x) ≥ fi(0) ⇒ fi(x) ≥
fi(0)(1− Fi(x)). Therefore, we get:
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1− F ∗i,~p−i(q) =
∫ ∞
M
(1− Fi(x))gi,~p−i(q, x)dx+
∏
j 6=i
Fj(M +min
j 6=i
{pj} − q)
≤
∫ ∞
M
fi(x)
fi(0)
gi,~p−i(q, x)dx+
∏
j 6=i
Fj(M +min
j 6=i
{pj} − q)
= f∗i,~p−i(q)/fi(0) +
∏
j 6=i
Fj(M +min
j 6=i
{pj} − q).
Similarly, we can write:
−(f∗i,~p−i)′(q) = −
∫ ∞
M
f ′i(x)gi,~p−i(q, x)dx− fi(0)gi,~p−i(q,M)
≤
∫ ∞
M
fi(x)fi(0)gi,~p−i(q, x)dx− fi(0)gi,~p−i(q,M)
≤ fi(0)f∗i,~p−i(q)− fi(0)gi,~p−i(q,M).
Therefore, we get:
(1− F ∗i,~p−i(q)) · (−f∗i,~p−i)′(q) ≤ (f∗i,~p−i(q))2 + fi(0)gi,~p−i(q,M) · (1− F ∗i,~p−i(q))
−
∏
j 6=i
Fj(M +min
j 6=i
{pj} − q)
∫ ∞
M
f ′i(x)gi,~p−i(q, x)dx.
So if we can show that
fi(0)gi,~p−i(q,M) · (1− F ∗i,~p−i(q))−
∏
j 6=i
Fj(M +min
j 6=i
{pj} − q)
∫ ∞
M
f ′i(x)gi,~p−i(q, x)dx ≤ 0,
then we will have established that (1−F ∗i,~p−i(q)) ·(−f∗i,~p−i)′(q) ≤ (f∗i,~p−i(q))2, and therefore F ∗i,~p−i
is MHR. Observe that this is clearly true when M = q − minj 6=i{pj}, as the entire term above is
0 (because gi,~p−i(q, q − minj 6=i{pj}) = 0 and Fj(0) = 0 for all j). So the remaining case is when
M = 0. Here, we derive the following (justification for each equation follows).
−
∫ ∞
0
f ′i(x)gi,~p−i(q, x)dx ≤
∫ ∞
0
fi(0)fi(x)gi,~p−i(q, x)dx
⇒ −
∫∞
0 f
′
i(x)gi,~p−i(q, x)dx
fi(0)gi,~p−i(q, 0)
≤
∫ ∞
0
fi(x)gi,~p−i(q, x)/gi,~p−i(q, 0)dx
=
∫ ∞
0
fi(x)
∑
j 6=i fj(x− q + pj)
∏
k/∈{i,j} Fk(x− q + pk)∑
j 6=i fj(pj − q)
∏
k/∈{i,j} Fk(pk − q)
dx
⇒−
∏
k 6=i Fk(pk − q)
∫∞
0 f
′
i(x)gi,~p−i(q, x)dx
fi(0)gi,~p−i(q, 0)
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≤
∫ ∞
0
fi(x)
∑
j 6=i fj(x− q + pj)Fj(pj − q)
∏
k/∈{i,j} Fk(x− q + pk)∑
j 6=i fj(pj − q)
dx
≤
∫ ∞
0
fi(x)
∑
j 6=i fj(x− q + pj)
∏
k 6=i Fk(x− q + pk)∑
j 6=i fj(pj − q)
dx
≤
∫ ∞
0
fi(x)
∏
k 6=i
Fk(x− q + pk)dx
= 1− F ∗p (q).
The first inequality follows by definition of F being MHR+. The second follows by dividing
both sides by fi(0)gi,~p−i(q, 0), which is positive. The third line follows by evaluating the definition
of gi,~p−i(q, x).
The fourth line then follows by multiplying both sides by
∏
k 6=i Fk(pk − q), which is positive.
The fifth line follows as for all j, Fj(pj − q) ≤ Fj(x− q+ pj). The penultimate line follows because
for all j, Fj has decreasing density (and therefore fj(x− q + pj) ≤ fj(pj − q) for all j).
The final line follows from the following reasoning. Recall that 1− F ∗i,~p−i(q) denotes the proba-
bility that the buyer will choose to purchase item i when item i has price q and all other items have
price ~p−i. The probability that this occurs conditioned on vi = x is exactly
∏
k 6=i Fk(x + pk − q),
and the previous term simply integrates this times fi(x) over all x.
Finally, observe that this inequality is exactly what we want, as (the first line below is exactly
what we just proved above, and the final line is our remaining task).
−Fn−1(p− q) ∫∞0 f ′i(x)gp(q, x)dx
fi(0)gp(q, 0)
≤ 1− F ∗p (q)
⇒ −Fn−1(p− q)
∫ ∞
0
f ′i(x)gp(q, x)dx ≤ fi(0)gp(q,M) · (1− F ∗p (q))
⇒ −fi(0)gp(q,M) · (1− F ∗p (q))− F (M + p− q)n−1
∫ ∞
M
f ′i(x)gp(q, x)dx ≤ 0.
C. Calculations for Examples
Recall that F ∗p (q) denotes the probability that a consumer drawn from D = Fn does not have the
highest utility for the lone provider (n) setting price q, when the other providers 1, . . . , n−1 are set-
ting price p. Then, the expected payoff of the lone provider (n) in this circumstance is q ·(1−F ∗p (q)).
Consider the following class of examples, which we’ll refer to as Fε,k. Note that the hazard
rate is the most interesting part of the distribution, and the CDF ensures such a distribution is
well-defined.
hFε,k(x) = ε x.p.
1
k Fε,k(x) = 1− e−εx fε,k(x) = εe−εx for x ≤ ln(k)ε
hFε,k(x) = 1 x.p. 1− 1k Fε,k(x) = 1− ( 1k )1−
1
ε e−x fε,k(x) = ( 1k )
1− 1
ε e−x for x > ln(k)ε
Observation 5. For all ε ∈ (0, 1], k ≥ 1, Fε,k is MHR.
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Lemma C.1. There exists ε ∈ (0, 1), k > 1, such that F ∗p,(ε,k) is anti-MHR.
Proof. We start by defining an even more general class of MHR distributions. In particular, let
c1 < c2 be any two positive constants, and let F be any distribution that satisfies the following
properties:
1− F (x) = f(x)c1 and −f ′(x) = c1f(x) for x ∈ [max{0, q − p}, x1]
and 1− F (x) = f(x)c2 and −f ′(x) = c2f(x) for x ∈ [x1,∞)
Clearly, F is MHR because ∀x, −f ′(x)[1−F (x)] ≤ f(x)2. We now compute −f ′∗p (q)[1−F ∗p (q)]
to see whether F ∗p (q) is MHR or not.
1− F ∗p (q) =
∫ x1
M gp(q, x)[1− F (x)]dx+ Fn−1(M + p− q)
=
∫ x1
M gp(q, x)
f(x)
c1
dx+
∫∞
x1
gp(q, x)
f(x)
c2
dx+ Fn−1(M + p− q)
−f ′∗p (q) =
∫∞
M gp(q, x)[−f ′(x)]dx− f(0)gp(q,M)
=
∫ x1
M gp(q, x)c1f(x)dx+
∫∞
x1
gp(q, x)c2f(x)dx− f(0)gp(q,M)
−f ′∗p (q)[1− F ∗p (q)]
=
∫ x1
M gp(q, x)
f(x)
c1
dx · ∫ x1M gp(q, x)c1f(x)dx
+
∫ x1
M gp(q, x)
f(x)
c1
dx · ∫∞x1 gp(q, x)c2f(x)dx
+
∫∞
x1
gp(q, x)
f(x)
c2
dx · ∫ x1M gp(q, x)c1f(x)dx
+
∫∞
x1
gp(q, x)
f(x)
c2
dx · ∫∞x1 gp(q, x)c2f(x)dx
+[Fn−1(M + p− q)][−f ′∗p (q)]− [1− F ∗p (q)][f(0)gp(q,M)]− [Fn−1(M + p− q)][f(0)gp(q,M)]
Note this last term can be reformulated as: −a = [Fn−1(M+p−q)][−f ′∗p (q)]−[1−F ∗p (q)][f(0)gp(q,M)]−
[Fn−1(M + p− q)][f(0)gp(q,M)] ≥ −2[f(0)gp(q,M)] = −2c1gp(q,M) and is thus lower bounded by
a constant. We can now rewrite the product as follows:
−f ′∗p (q)[1− F ∗p (q)]
=
∫ x1
M gp(q, x)f(x)dx ·
∫ x1
M gp(q, x)f(x)dx
+ c2c1
∫ x1
M gp(q, x)f(x)dx ·
∫∞
x1
gp(q, x)f(x)dx
+ c1c2
∫∞
x1
gp(q, x)f(x)dx ·
∫ x1
M gp(q, x)f(x)dx
+
∫∞
x1
gp(q, x)f(x)dx ·
∫∞
x1
gp(q, x)f(x)dx
−a (assume worst case a ≥ 0)
−f ′∗p (q)[1− F ∗p (q)]
=
∫ x1
M gp(q, x)f(x)dx ·
∫∞
M gp(q, x)f(x)dx
+( c2c1 − 1)
∫ x1
M gp(q, x)f(x)dx ·
∫∞
x1
gp(q, x)f(x)dx
+( c1c2 − 1)
∫∞
x1
gp(q, x)f(x)dx ·
∫ x1
M gp(q, x)f(x)dx
+
∫∞
x1
gp(q, x)f(x)dx ·
∫∞
M gp(q, x)f(x)dx
−a
−f ′∗p (q)[1− F ∗p (q)]
=
∫∞
M gp(q, x)f(x)dx ·
∫∞
M gp(q, x)f(x)dx
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+( c2c1 +
c1
c2
− 2) ∫ x1M gp(q, x)f(x)dx · ∫∞x1 gp(q, x)f(x)dx− a
= f∗p (q)2 + (b
∫∞
M gp(q, x)f(x)dx ·
∫∞
M gp(q, x)f(x)dx− a) (with b = c2c1 + c1c2 − 2 > 1, because
c2
c1
> 1)
Note that b can be made as large as possible for fixed a, and so we get the following:
−f ′∗p (q)[1− F ∗p (q)] >
∫∞
M gp(q, x)f(x)dx ·
∫∞
M gp(q, x)f(x)dx = f
∗
p (q)
2
Thus, for any MHR distribution F defined as above, Fp* is anti-MHR.
We now provide an example distribution (Fp,(ε,k)) that satisfies the conditions of the distribution
class characterized by F . Indeed, the distribution Fp,(ε,k) is just a special case of the distribution F .
By setting c1 = ε, c2 = 1, and F (x1) = 1k for the distribution F , we obtain the distribution Fp,(ε,k).
Thus, MHR F can, in fact, lead to non-MHR (and even lead to anti-MHR) F ∗p . In other words,
non-decreasing h can lead to non-monotone (and even lead to non-increasing) h∗p because the MHR
condition −f ′∗p (q)[1 − F ∗p (q)] ≤ f∗p (q)2 is violated, as shown in the example above where F = Fε,k
and F ∗p = F ∗p,(ε,k).
Therefore, there exists ε ∈ (0, 1), k > 1, such that Fε,k is MHR but F ∗p,(ε,k) is anti-MHR.
We now define a setting where the consumer is drawn from D = Fnε,k where Fε,k is the distri-
bution we defined above. Assume providers 1, . . . , n − 1 set price p, and provider n sets price q.
The consumer has n− 1 external options valued at maxi 6=n vi − p and will only purchase from the
lone provider (n) at price q if the utility from provider n is better than the utility from providers
1, . . . , n− 1.
Provider n has payoff q ·Pr~v←D[n = argmaxi{vi − pi}] with pi = p,∀j 6= n and pn = q and sets
the revenue maximizing price argmaxq(q
∫
fε,k(x)
∏
i 6=n Pr[vi − p < x− q])
= argmaxq(q
∫
fε,k(x)
∏
i 6=n Pr[vi < −q + x+ p]dx)
= argmaxq(q
∫
fε,k(x)
∏
i 6=n Fε,k(−q + x+ p)dx)
= argmaxq(q
∫
fε,k(x)F
n−1
ε,k (−q + x+ p)dx)
We now restrict our attention to the case where there are only two providers (n = 2). Consumer
valuations are drawn from D = F 2ε,k. Thus, provider n (i.e. 2) sets the revenue maximizing price
argmaxq(q
∫
fε,k(x)F
n−1
ε,k (−q + x+ p)dx) = argmaxq(q
∫
fε,k(x)Fε,k(−q + x+ p)dx)
Consider the case where q ≥ p. Whenever x < q − p, provider n will never be chosen
since Pr[maxi 6=nvi − p < x − q] = 0, so we get the following integral bounds: argmaxq[q ·∫∞
q−p fε,k(x)Fε,k(−q + x + p)dx] = argmaxq q · (12eε(−q+p) − 1k2 [ 11+ε − 12 ][e−ε(−q+p) − e(−q+p)]
)
We can now conclude that, in the two-provider scenario, for all ε ∈ (0, 1), k ≥ 1, when
provider 1 uses the price p, provider 2 best responds by setting the revenue maximizing price
argmaxq q · (12eε(−q+p) − 1k2 [ 11+ε − 12 ][e−ε(−q+p) − e(−q+p)] )
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We now use specific instances of this best-response result to prove the lemmas below.
Lemma C.2. When ε = 0.1, k = 2, n = 2, the MHR distribution D = Fnε,k = F
2
0.1,2 has no
symmetric equilibrium.
Proof. When there are only two providers (n = 2), our setting then becomes that of a consumer
drawn from D = F 2ε,k. In particular for k = 2, i.e. when the consumer is drawn from D = F
2
ε,2,
provider 2 is best responding by setting the revenue maximizing price argmaxq q · (12eε(−q+p) −
1
k2
[ 11+ε − 12 ][e−ε(−q+p) − e(−q+p)] ) = argmaxq q · (12eε(−q+p) − 14 [ 11+ε − 12 ][e−ε(−q+p) − e(−q+p)] )
Using the formula from Proposition 3.2, we compute the hazard rate of the second highest value
hn2 (Fε,k) =
3
4 · ε+ 14 = 3ε+14 = 3·0.1+14 = 1340 which gives the unique potential symmetric equilibrium
price p = 1/hn2 (Fε,k) =
40
13
Provider 2 is now best responding to this potential symmetric equilibrium price p = 4013 by setting
the revenue maximizing price defined above as argmaxq q · (12eε(−q+
40
13
) − 14 [ 11+ε − 12 ][e−ε(−q+
40
13
) −
e(−q+
40
13
)] ). Solving for this gives q = 3.50618 6= p, at a revenue of 1.53855.
The prices are not equal, thus we don’t have symmetric equilibrium
Therefore, when ε = 0.1, k = 2, n = 2, the MHR distribution D = Fnε,k has no symmetric
equilibrium.
Observation 6. If F is MHR, then Hn2 (F ) is weakly decreasing in n. If F is anti-MHR, then
Hn2 (F ) is weakly increasing in n.
Lemma C.3. When n = 2, ε > 127 , and k = 2, D = F
n
ε,k satisfies the Limit Entry Condition, but
does not have a symmetric equilibrium in the Free Market setting.
Proof. We refer to the same example above (in Lemma A.2) where we had n = 2, ε = 0.1, and
k = 2. We showed that it has no symmetrical equilibrium. However, any ε > 127 guarantees
that Hn1 (Fε,k) <
n
hn2 (Fε,k)
and thus satisfies the Limit-Entry Condition. In particular, when
ε = 0.1 > 127 , D = F
2
ε,2 satisfies the Limit Entry Condition but does not have a symmetric equilib-
rium in the Free Market setting.
Therefore, when n = 2, ε > 127 , and k = 2, D = F
n
ε,k satisfies the Limit Entry Condition, but
does not have a symmetric equilibrium in the Free Market setting.
Lemma C.4. When n = 2, ε = 0.02, and k = 43 , D = F
n
ε,k has a symmetric equilibrium in the Free
Market setting, but does not satisfy the Limit Entry Condition.
Proof. We again consider the two-provider setting (n = 2) where the consumer is drawn from
D = F 2ε,k. In this instance, we set ε = 0.02, and k =
4
3 , i.e. when the consumer is drawn from
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D = F 2
0.02, 4
3
. Using the formula from Proposition 3.2, we compute the hazard rate of the sec-
ond highest value hn2 (Fε,k) =
13
160 which gives the unique potential symmetric equilibrium price
p = 1/hn2 (Fε,k) =
160
13 = 12.308
Provider 2 is now best responding to this potential symmetric equilibrium price p = 16013 by
setting the revenue maximizing price defined above as argmaxq q · (12e0.02(−q+
160
3
) − (34)2[ 11+0.02 −
1
2 ][e
−0.02(−q+ 160
3
) − e(−q+ 1603 )] ) for q ≥ 1603 . Solving for this gives q = 1603 = p and revenue = 803 .
We thus have a symmetrical equilibrium since the best response to p is q = p.
We now check if the Limit Entry condition is satisfied. First, we compute the terms for the
Limit-Entry Condition as follows:
Hn1 (Fε,k) = (
3
4)
2 · 10.02 + [1− (34)2] · 1 = 28.5625 (exact)
hn2 (Fε,k) = [1−(1− 34)2]·0.02+(1− 34)2·1 = 1516 ·0.02+ 116 = 13160 which gives 1hn2 (Fε,k) =
160
13 = 12.308
Note that Hn1 (Fε,k) >
2
hn2 (Fε,k)
which violates the Limit-Entry Condition.
Therefore, when n = 2, ε = 0.02, and k = 43 , D = F
n
ε,k has a symmetric equilibrium in the Free
Market setting, but does not satisfy the Limit Entry Condition.
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